Referring to the Platonic division between the transcendent and the immanent world as but a manifestation of the former, Søren Kierkegaard grasped the phenomenal character of the earthly world. According to Kierkegaard, in Transcendence, God is, and the transcendent Ideas exist as patterns of beings given to us in temporality, the fontal phenomenal character of which (as manifestations) intertwines with the real mundane ontological character. Kierkegaard argued against the Hegelian theory of dialectics, as well as the pathos theory, presenting dialecticity and patheticness as two ways in which the existing subject refers to the immanent world of temporality and the spiritual realm of Transcendence. The process of phenomenalisation, accomplished along with the existence of all earthly beings, is accompanied by a singular, subjective response of each individual to the immanent world. This response assumes the form of a dialectical balanced reaction, or a pathetic, hyperbolic, in the aesthetic, ethical and religious stages of individual existence (in the religious stage, it is a response to the world of Transcendence). The paper is dedicated to discussing the relations of the process of the phenomenalisation of Transcendence to its individual, religious responses, particularly the relations to the pathetic type of religious response, as indicated by Kierkegaard.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to specify Søren Kierkegaard's views on pathos and the pathetic, the aspects of which are characterised along with the mutual entanglement of the pathetic and the dialectical. The Hegelian philosophy, above all the phenomenology of Spirit, grasping reality as a realm of phenomena, i.e. manifestations of the Spirit, was a significant object of polemics in Kierkegaard's philosophical works. Kierkegaard contrasted the theory of history as a science based on the construction of the past with the Hegelian theory of die Geschichte and history. Referring to the Platonic division between the transcendent and the immanent world as but a manifestation of the former, he grasped the phenomenal character of the earthly world. According to Kierkegaard, in Transcendence, God is, and the transcendent Ideas exist as patterns of beings given to us in temporality, the fontal phenomenal character of which (as manifestations) intertwines with the real mundane ontological character. Kierkegaard argued against the Hegelian theory of dialectics, as well as the pathos theory, presenting dialecticity and patheticness as two ways in which the existing subject refers to: 1) the immanent world of temporality, 2) the spiritual realm of Transcendence. The process of phenomenalisation, accomplished along with the existence of all earthly beings, is accompanied by a singular, subjective response of each individual to the immanent world. The response assumes the form of a dialectical balanced reaction, or a pathetic, hyperbolic, overexpressive, in the aesthetic and ethical stages of individual existence. However, in terms of the religious stage, it is a response to the world of Transcendence, and also assumes two forms: dialectical and pathetic, this time related to two types of individual religiousness. This paper aims to discuss the relation of the process of the phenomenalisation of Transcendence to its individual, religious responses, particularly, the relations to the pathetic type of religious response, as indicated by Kierkegaard. Assimilation, i.e. the absorption of the contents of a given knowledge, seems to be parallel to the conception of manifestation -acquiring the subjective knowledge that somehow "manifests itself" in the cognitive processes of the subject. Therefore, consideration of Kierkegaard's theses regarding the subjective cognitive construction as a result of the process of assimilation, within the context of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and his followers, is possible and justified, for in the theses of the phenomenologists we find, i.a. issues of passive syntheses and cognitive data as that which is "given", and the employment of the term "phenomenon" and, simultaneously, the term "manifestation", to characterise the subject's own lived experiences (e.g. remorse, sin, love) .
In regard to the first interpretation of phenomenalism as a variant of cognitive representationalism, one should highlight that Kierkegaard uses the term "idea", i.e. "transcendent form," in a Platonic, not Cartesian, sense. Next, the term "ideal" is applied in a Kantian sense. Kierkegaard separates the idea from the ideal, which is the result of idealisation, and the starting point of his position -which combines essentialism with nominalism -is the consistent essential attitude, i.e., the essential assumptions present among others in his concept of the human being. This concept applies to the essential human needs, resulting in the creation of ideals and personal patterns, which are a kind of personalisation of ideals. Kierkegaard follows Friedrich W. J. Schelling, who warned that the human ability to construct the object of cognition and the object of desire may result in the idealisation of things, people and events that are important to the individual person, but accidental3. It is therefore necessary to choose the object that undergoes idealisation, which would be the appropriate model, and its value (the value ascribed to it) will be right and normatively proper. Therefore, grasping the concepts of history as cognitive constructs, Schelling postulated referring to "sacred history", which may be the proper, edifying, ethical pattern of conduct. Kierkegaard (e.g. Philosophical Fragments) also cites the argument of "sacred history" as a story that is always up-to-date, beyond time and its temporary conditioning, and pattern-forming, referring to the essential in being.
As we know, in his epistemological theses, Kierkegaard combines representationalism with the conception of assimilation, i.e. acquiring knowledge by the subject. The concept of assimilation is taken from the Augustinian tradition without, however, referring to Augustine. One must stress that according to Kierkegaard, cognition is not related solely to the recognition of representations -mental images, associated with particular concepts and particular general names in a language. According to Kierkegaard, assimilation, i.e . the adoption of mental content, that is, the recognition of the sense and meaning of psychological contents and mental states, is necessary.
In theses concerning assimilation and psychology as the postulated science regarding the soul (i.e. mental states and acts), the second conception of phenomenalisation is present. Phenomenalisation relates to the mental states of the subject, i.e. the acts rather than simply the objects of these acts (as is apparent in representationalism). Using colloquial language, and in relation to Kierkegaard's psychologism, phenomenalisation is related to the "states of the soul". Phenomenalisation regarded as such appears most often in the considerations pertaining to possible phenomenology in Kierkegaard's thought -a phenomenon in the Hegelian sense of manifestation rather than representation (as in René Descartes and John Locke). Simultaneously, this phenomenon as a manifestation is related to the mental, spiritual sphere, therefore, it is -in Kierkegaard's terms -internalised. Conceived as such, the phenomenon remains within the framework of subjectivity, similar to every mental representation: it is a specific mental content, submitted to cognition and experience. Kierkegaard's concept of truth relates exactly to truth that is submitted to subjectivisation -a subjective, internalised truth and its particular object is an assortment of the subject's mental states.
Kierkegaard on pathos and patheticness
In contemporary philosophy, the category of patheticness is present i.a. in the works of Emmanuel Lévinas and Michel Henry. In the theory of literature and the theory of art, pathos has been combined with hyperbole, with exaggeration and excess. However, the understanding of pathos exhibits different sources of its meaning in philosophy, which are to be found in Aristotle.
Aristotle distinguished between nous pathetikos, i.e. the passive, receptive mind, and nous poietikos, the active mind. Thus the patheticness would be related to receptivity and even passiveness. In Rhetoric, Aristotle argues that the influence of a speech is threefold, each aspect being related to particular elements of communication -the speaker, the listener, and the speech itself. Ethos is related to the attitude of the speaker, pathos determines the influence on the listener, and logos is related to the contents and the structure of the argument of the speech itself.4 One must highlight that such understanding of patheticness should be distinguished from "pathy" -related to the word "apatheia", as well as with terms such as "empathy", "sympathy" -from "pathy" as a term meaning that which is experienced. Aristotle considers pathos in Poetics as well, and combines the category of pathos with poiesis -with productive practice in general, particularly with a practice that applies the spoken word as its instrument. Pathos is characteristic of tragedy -the elements that influence the recipient strongly are pathetic, so that they cause pity or fear.5 According to Aristotle, however, the aim of pathos is not to instil fear, which Aristotle differentiates from awe. Aristotle relates pathos with epic poetry as well (the example of Homer).6
In Rhetoric and Poetics, Aristotle distinguishes between ethics and the pathetic -a distinction that may help explain the category of patheticness in Kierkegaard's thought. Søren Kierkegaard confronts: ethics and the pathetic, on one side, dialectic and the pathetic, on the other. The ethical stage of life is strictly related to that which is dialectical in meaning -dialogical (maieutic) but balanced (the balance of two contradictory propositions with both allowed equal possibility; that is, logic as a dialectic according to Plato and Aristotle). Here, one should remember that the Greek term "ethos" means a constant way of acting, a custom. In the early modern tradition, the term "ethos" describes a certain actual form of morality and an assortment of customs of a particular social group. One should stress that Kierkegaard combines the ethical with a universally accepted normativity and he relates to the Greek understanding of ethos. Additionally, one should bring forward Immanuel Kant's distinction, when he was considering pathos in reference to that which is ethical, between pathos as a virtue connected with affects and pathos as a defect connected with passions.7
Kierkegaard conceived pathos in a twofold manner as well, but more according to Greek sources and tradition. The first understanding of pathos is related to its rhetorical aspect found in Aristotle's Rhetoric -it is a rhetorical pathos of influencing the listener by an efficient rhetorician. The second understanding is more in terms of Aristotelian Poetics: it is a way of affecting the recipient, considering the means of expression as elements of poiesis, the productive practice. In Greek tradition, the second understanding of pathos is related to overdrawing, and the prevalence of selected features, i.e. their imbalance. This is why Kierkegaard confronts the pathetic properties of existence and action with that which is dialectical and therefore balanced. Pathetic elements and aspects constitute the initial point of dialecticity. However, they also distort and transform to a certain degree that which is dialectical. Patheticness conceived as such is based on a strong sensual experience that stimulates the subject and combines with subjective expression. It is particularly characteristic of the aesthetic stage of life, when the subject is focused on sensual experience within the mundane world of Immanence.
The patheticness and the stages of life
Within the framework of the indicated life stages of the aesthetic, ethical and religious, Søren Kierkegaard distinguishes between the dialectical and pathetic and, separately, the concentric and eccentric aspects. Kierkegaard primarily analyses the mutual relation of the dialectical and the pathetic, chiefly in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript, considering their previous distinction and their mutual implications. In a number of places, he highlights that the state of dialectical balance is the aim of the subject in every life stage. In the aesthetic stage, the aim would be to achieve balance in the relations between two individuals, but also in the relation of the subject to itself. The importance of marriage8, described in his work Either-Or, is based on a strong pathetic experience, but primarily it has the afore-mentioned ability. The relation requires a certain mediation, going beyond a naive view about the simple directness of one's own experience.
In the ethical stage, the aim consists of the dialectical-dialogical balance in relations between the I and the Other. However, elements of pathos are also present: the stimulation for ethical, morally just action, and the exaggerated focus of the subject on itself as the cause of action. In the religious stage, pathetic religiousness is related to the subject losing itself to its self-accusations in its experiences of sin and contrition. However, it is simultaneously an exaggerated attachment to rites, to the external, religious rituals and the world of Immanence.
Kierkegaard connects pathos and the patheticness of the aesthetic stage with the concept of eccentricity -eccentric attitude, an exaggerated directing of the subject towards the world and the stimulations coming from it. Kierkegaard describes eccentricity, i.e. the directing of the subject towards externality, as characteristic of pathos in general. However, one should underline that according to Kierkegaard, in dialectic as the balance of ethos and the excess of pathos, these somehow determine each other; both these manners of a subjective experience of the relation to oneself and to the world are given to individuals [to us] along with their anthropological equipment. Additionally, one should highlight that Kierkegaard related to the romantic and the Hegelian understanding of pathos as well.
One must add that Kierkegaard also refers to the concept of pathos in its romantic understanding, as well as in the understanding of Georg W. F. Hegel (i.a. Aesthetics. Lectures on Fine Art). Hegel refers to the Ancient Greek understanding of pathos as that which characterises human and divine matters. However, in volume I of his Lectures, Hegel defines pathos as that which characterises the actions of human beings, not God, being an essential and rational content of the human self, which is submitted to expression, simultaneously being the content of human creation -of works of art. Therefore, he indicates the necessity of differentiating between subjective and objective pathos, as well as a pathos typical of aesthetics and "an ethical 'pathos'".9 "'Pathos' moves us because in and for itself it is the mighty power in human existence."10 Pathos is a means of expression, particularly as a means of poetic expression. Simultaneously, Hegel associates pathos with tragedy, defining it as the "tragic pathos" -an actor expresses a general tragic pathos.11
Kierkegaard's publications contain numerous polemics against Hegel's philosophy, including the aforementioned Concluding Unscientific Postscript. The Dane argues against Hegel's conception of dialectics, while suggesting his own definitions of pathos and patheticness, exceeding its aesthetic understanding. Kierkegaard associates pathos with a certain attitude of the existing subject to itself and to the world, to the being and to its existence, the special case being the own existence of man. Therefore, he associates pathos with all three stages of life, apprehending pathos in relation to subjective affectivity rather than to subjective rationality (being the theme of dialectics). He presents how the pathetic surfaces in the eccentric and concentric attitudes of the subject when directed towards the world and realising its own role in the world -the role of a social actor, who eventually is responsible not before the people in the Immanence of the mundane world, but before God and the world of Transcendence.
One may say that Kierkegaard defines the subject along with its mode of existence in a two-fold way, describing its attitude towards itself and to its existence as eccentric and concentric. Concentricity would constitute a certain supplement to eccentricity. It would be a focusing of the individual on itself, and may be admitted as a certain type of a reflective attitude of the subject towards itself. However, the concentric attitude cannot be tied to egoism, as the eccentric cannot be tied to altruism. Eccentricity is related to distraction of attention, a certain forgetfulness of the subject concerning itself in sensual experiences and, simultaneously, to the search for its own pleasure. Therefore, it would be a forgetfulness of the I concerning other subjectivity, the subjectivity of Others. Eccentricity is appropriate neither for the ethical stage, nor the religious stage characterised by the concentric attitude related to the self-knowledge of the individual and to the choices directed at the Other and at Transcendence. However, these choices are consistently individual and subjective. The concentric attitude is tied to the search for transcendent elements within subjective immanence, and consideration of the self-soul of the individual and individual existence within transcendent categories.
According to Kierkegaard, the eccentric mode of the attitude of an individual, strictly associated with the pathetic character of expression, would be typical of the aesthetic stage of life. It is the direction of the subject towards the world of mundane Immanence, i.a. treated as a source of legitimate models. One must remember that for the Dane eccentricity is associated with distraction, leading to the individual being lost in the world of Immanence and to forgetting itself in sensual experience. Then the egocentric attitude -the individualism of the subject placing its Ego in the centre of the mundane world -would be a certain supplement to the eccentric attitude. According to Kierkegaard, the eccentric attitude, typical of the aesthetic stage, would also suit the dialectics of the external and the internal, as well as of the direct and the indirect. One must highlight that Kierkegaard is considering the matters of aesthetics, including the "aesthetic pathos", in association with selflessness (in Kantian terms) and eccentricity -with the eccentric exceeding of the subject and searching for the other. It would be a certain dialectics of direct sensual experience and simultaneous forgetting of the self of the subject who comes openly towards the Other.
On the other hand, in the case of the ethical and religious stages, this eccentric attitude subsides somewhat, because the individual, by the power of choice and decision, assumes a concentric attitude. Therefore, concentricity characterises the individualistic subject that legitimises its own individuality, not by relating to its unique Ego, but by relating to Transcendence, which guarantees the uniqueness of each individual being and the separateness of its existence. A different pathos would be typical of the ethical and religious stage, as well as a different eccentricity -the eccentric, i.e. external attitude of the existing subject towards Transcendence, and the spiritual, not sensual. In the case of the ethical and religious stages, concentricity would, therefore, constitute a certain supplement of this different eccentricity. The concentric attitude is related to self-knowledge and the choices of the individual, and consequently is individual and subjective, but directed at the Other and Transcendence. The concentric attitude is connected with recognition of the subjective character of truth and the individual status of not only the Ego but also the Other. That is why Kierkegaard writes about the "higher circle of concentricity" associated with the "ethical sphere", as well as about the "higher eccentric circles". In the ethical stage, it is exactly concentricity that should constitute the proper initial point of this dialectics of concentricity and eccentricity.
As already mentioned, the eccentric attitude of the subject, dominant in the aesthetic stage of life, is related to the expression of the subject directed at the external, and finding there the confirmation of its own existence and actions. It is easy to recognise that, particularly in his early and pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard conceived expression -according to the postulates of Romanticism -in very broad terms, as a mode of existence, chosen and manifested by the individual. In terms of ethical communication, expression is related to pathos, with affecting listeners, while ethos is conceived in its proper -one could say, Aristotelian -context, as the action of an individual in regard to Others by the power of one's own rational choice. One could say that in these works, primarily dedicated to aesthetic and ethical issues, Kierkegaard answered the question pertaining to the limits of expression, noting the lack thereof, as indicated by the subject that engages in relationships with Others. The pathos of expression -the exaggeration and the hyperbola of the subjective enunciation affecting listeners -may be found in his pseudonymous works, where the narrators violate social, communicational and moral rules by the power of conscious choices (i.e. The Seducer's Diary from part I of Either-Or). Simultaneously, the narrators of these works attempt to find that on which they could support their own existence and own judgements. Therefore, the pathetic character of expression would combine with the lack of its limits and the necessity of establishing a boundary of the influence of the subject, and, above all, his engagement in existence by the power of choice.
One may summarise that, according to Kierkegaard, an ever-individual mode of existence requires an individual establishment, by the power of choice, of the limits of one's own subjective expression. By the power of the ethical choice of existence, the pathos of aesthetic expression -as the manifestation of one's own existence in the world and against the world -transforms into the ethical pathos, aiming not at the Ego but at the relation of the Ego to the Other. The religious pathos is related to the expression of faith, with the social manifestation of an ever-subjective and individual relation of the subject referring to Transcendence. Therefore, the religious pathos, supplemented by the dialectical, characterises the expression of behaviour and actions related to faith, particularly in the religious stage of life.
The ethical and the pathetic
Søren Kierkegaard apprehends the pathetic in relation to dialectics -dialectics as a certain mutual medium of two judgements that supplement rather than exclude one another, and that cannot be settled or unified. As is well known, Kierkegaard disputes Georg W. F. Hegel on numerous occasions, and one may assume that in his work titled The Sickness Unto Death, he once again attempted to establish his own conception of dialectics, following The Concept of Anxiety and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Kierkegaard adopted Hegel's assumption regarding the dialectical mediation in a triadic system of elements, the necessary contradiction of two opposing elements, and their relation that constitutes their certain synthesis. He also adopted the assumption concerning the expanding dialectical system, the opposing elements of which enter further dialectical relations. Kierkegaard follows Hegel in characterising the dialectics of being and thought. However, his argument does not come from the ontological and semantic primacy of the logical concept. Rather, the starting point of his ontology is the status of the subject of existence and of cognition, and such subjectification is related to the teleological theory of semantics: the aim of existence is always selected as a result of an individual decision and choice; it defines the sense of existence and the meanings of actions and creations of the subjective being. Kierkegaard does not outline a perspective that removes the ontological difference between being and thought, but in his polemics against Hegel, he highlights the ontological and logical irremovability of this difference on numerous occasions. In his analyses, the Dane underlines the difference between the separate being that is the human individual, and the beliefs, knowledge, and faith that amount to a subjective feeling of oneself as a separate being. Coordination of one's own being with one's own ontological thinking related primarily to oneself as a being in a certain coming to be, in existence, constitutes a challenge and a subiectum problem, which is solved in the synthesis of both dialectical elements, always accomplished temporarily, in a connection that, ultimately, does not remove the difference.
Another dialectical connection is the synthesis of the mental apprehension of oneself as a separate being in coming to be, as well as a reflective, self-returning consideration of oneself -a synthesis that Kierkegaard, following Fichte, defines as "self" (Fichtean das Selbst). This expanding dialectical system of subjective reflection is submitted to the regularities of temporal development. However, it is not accomplished on the macro-scale of history, but on the micro-scale of individual existence, i.e. it is a certain universal regularity that dialectically combines the rule's necessity and the individual free choice, because this necessity of the rule turns out to be -paradoxically -the necessity of making free choices.
The Kierkegaardian dialectics may be grasped as a certain system of rational argumentation expanding in time, supplemented by reference to dialectical paradoxes of the relation of knowledge and faith, as well as the paradoxes of faith alone. Kierkegaard's dialectics refers to Plato's and, particularly, Aristotle's dialectics, i.e. to logic and logical argumentation based on the concomitance and equivalence of two logical propositions, positive and negative. Simultaneously, Kierkegaard's dialectics takes into account the three Aristotelian ontological and logical principles: the law of contradiction, the principle of identity, and the law of excluded middle. The Dane adopts the third element of argumentation as a mediating component within the logical relation. However, he neither eliminates nor removes the contradiction between the extreme, opposite elements of the dialectical relation, and so it remains -both at the beginning and at the end of reasoning -based on the law of contradiction. Additionally, Kierkegaard does not acknowledge the law of identity as that which allows the reduction of the elements of dialectics to a single argument in reasoning, or to an ontological One of a certain principle. Rather, there is a synthesis of subiectum, at peace with itself in the feeling of its own, dynamically ever-becoming identity along with the existence of itself and the being of the world. The optimistic solution Kierkegaard provides at the end of his reasoning included in The Sickness Unto Death, i.e. the reference to faith, God and Power, appears to offer such an ontological One -God as the source and the aim of everything. However, human faith remains based on a paradox, and logical argumentation and rational knowledge are left with dialectics. The dialectics pertains to the necessary mediation of the internal relation of the subject to itself by a third factor, the external Power, internalised by the subiectum due to faith and the reflection regarding itself, as well as its own faith.
On numerous occasions, Kierkegaard argued against Hegel's conception of Aufhebung -the annulment of the difference within a dialectical relation -and found internal diversity both in the individual being (anthropos as an imperfect being, although destined to eternal salvation and spiritual perfection), and in diverse relations (dialectical, paradoxical relation of the covenant between God and human being). Kierkegaard, arguing against Hegel's theses and simultaneously a critical listener of Schelling's lectures (1841-1842), detects the impossibility of reducing the difference to the Same: God, as the principle of identity of every human being, leaves us torn between the temporal and the eternal, between life and death which is -dialectically, due to salvation -the passage to eternal life.
The issue of pathos appears in many of Kierkegaard's works, such as in his inquiries regarding irony and the Socratic sources of the ironic attitude, and his work regarding the stages of life. "The truth is not introduced into him but was in him. Socrates elaborates on this idea, and in it the Greek pathos is in fact concentrated, since it becomes a demonstration for the immortality of the soul -retrogressively, please note -or a demonstration for the pre-existence of the soul."12 Thorough reflections concerning the relations of dialectics and patheticness are to be found in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript -in a book subtitled A Mimetic-Pathetic-Dialectic Compilation. Kierkegaard characterises "existential pathos" here, and focuses on the description of two types of attitude, dialectical and pathetic, along with two types of religiousness. The relation of dialectics and patheticness would be characteristic of each of the three stages of life, and the dialectical balance would supplement the pathetic exaggeration and plethora differently in each case. Combining dialectics and patheticness seems peculiar in the ethical stage, mainly due to ethical choice, which is followed by the transition from existence conceived colloquially (Tilvaerelse) to the proper existence (Existents) of a subject that is aware of its existence, choices and aims in life. An ethical choice is followed by the possibility of the subject's pathetic experience of its own existence -a certain existential pathos.
Kierkegaard defined the mutual implications of the ethical and the pathetic, i.a. describing direct and indirect communication (e.g. in his journals and papers), communication that should be aimed at conveying some ethical content. As is known, Kierkegaard distinguished between the order of social norms and the order of normativity with transcendent sources given to particular subjectivities. He admitted the ethical as normative in the sense of accepted norms. However, the pathetic is communicated due to overplaying, exaggeration, because the contents characteristic of the pathetic message require an additional message. Such contents often exceed established norms (e.g. an exaggerated expression of internal states). Moreover, they implicitly contain the norms of transcendent sources, to which senders refer, particularly religious ones. In religious communication, the subject employs pathos, and it is possible because pathos -in accordance with the normativity socially accepted in the aesthetic stage of life, and later in ethical existence -is a known and accepted figure, particularly as an expression of the subject. One may say that Kierkegaard (similar to Hegel and the romanticists) associates the pathetic characteristics of the message with individual expression -despite being exaggerated and affective, not violating custom and moral normativity. According to Kierkegaard's conception of direct and indirect communication, such a pathetic message -in order to be received, i.e. "resubjectivised" by a different subject -requires additional messages, appositions, that would, for example, describe the context of the utterance.
According to the Dane, the broadly conceived pathos -as a lack of clearly indicated limits of the subject's expression and the context of its reception -would characterise all acts of communication, requiring appositions, answers and additional questions. Such pathetic dialogue -different from dialectical dialogue -has no clear framework, limits or ends, but aims at the dialectical balance of the interlocutors' reasons. In this pathetic way, aesthetic communication seems to be opened up, such that the subject expects answers and constant appositions. A good example of such pathos would be aesthetic repetition, requiring continuous strengthening of pleasant stimuli, leading to the sub-stage of grief, opening the subject to the ethical stage. In the religious stage, however, the communicating subject remains open to contents that have their source in Transcendence rather than mundane reality.
The ethical stage establishes for subjects the limits of norms and laws that are socially acceptable and realised, in the frame of which particular individuals should communicate and act so that their actions would be approved. However, here as well, Kierkegaard indicates dialogue based on exceeding the norm, on the pathetic opening of the message, on the exaggerated inquisitiveness of questions, and constant appositions, as the model attitude. The Socratic ironic attitude -of an inquisitive inquirer and persistent listener -is exactly the dialogical, ethical and, at the same time, pathetic attitude. Such apprehension of pathos brings the Aristotelian, rhetorical definition to mind -pathos conceived as an attitude of the recipient of the message, while ethos characterises the speaker. However, simultaneously, the pathetic as an activation and hyperbolisation characterises the speaker: in a maieutic dialogue the roles change and the speaker becomes the listener, while the listener, unexpectedly, reveals the hidden layers of the rational knowledge concerning Good to herself and to Others.
One should add that Kierkegaard described the ethical stage and ethics as a discipline of existential reflection, rather than a philosophical one in general. In Stages on Life's Way (1845), the courage and pride of ethics brings the pathos of tragic characters to mind, because ethics, as a courageous heroine plunges into judgement without heeding the consequences. However, the characters from Greek and Classicist tragedies, including the tragic characters from myth, refer to the judgement of fate or non-culpable accidental twists of fate. According to Kierkegaard, the pathos of the heroic Ethics involved in Good and Truth should not relate to verdicts of fate or of Logos, but to the resolutions of spiritual Transcendence, i.a. due to the close relation of ethics and religion.13 Additionally, the internal character of ethical pathos brings the ethical and the religious closer, first of all in the case of a dialectically balanced religiousness, where pathos is a "second place" element. The pathetic religiousness, manifested externally, brings the religious to aesthetics and its external pathos-oriented expression. Ultimately, the connexion between the aesthetic and the religious will allow Kierkegaard to determine the importance of aesthetics not only in the dialectical balance of sensual relations of an individual with the mundane world, but also in a pathetic, brave exposure to the relation with the Other. "In relation to an eternal happiness as the absolute good, pathos is not a matter of words, but of permitting this conception to transform the entire existence of the individual,"14 i.e. the pathos transforms the existence of human being.
Existential pathos

In his Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. A Mimetic-Pathetic-Dialectic
Compilation. An Existential Plea, Søren Kierkegaard describes expression as a pathetic manifestation of an individual presence in a mundane world of Immanence -as an individual and, first of all, aesthetic expression. One could say that Kierkegaard highlights the individual character of the expression of "aesthetic pathos" that may precede "existential pathos", related to the choice of absolute aims rather than mundane and relative ones. One should remember that Kierkegaard associates the issue of existence with matters of mimesis, particularly after aesthetical choice, and simultaneously establishes a social image. Individual expression allows the existing subject to engage, in its coming to be, with a given society, assume a social role, and play it out in an engaged way. However, the patheticness -in Kierkegaard's broadest understanding of the term "pathos" -eventually turns out to be an engagement of the existing subject in its ordinary existence [Tilvaerelse], whereas after making an ethical choice, it engages in its own proper existence [Existents]. Kierkegaard writes: "Aesthetic pathos expresses itself in words, and may in its truth indicate that the individual leaves his real self in order to lose himself in the Idea; while existential pathos is present whenever the Idea is brought into relation with the existence of the individual so as to transform it. If in relating itself to the individual's existence the absolute telos fails to transform it absolutely, the relationship is not one of existential pathos, but of aesthetic pathos."15
Precisely "existential pathos" is the theme of Kierkegaard's inquiries in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, where he writes: "The existing subjective thinker is in his existential relation to the truth as negative as he is positive; he has as much humour as he has essential pathos, and he is constantly in process of becoming, i.e. he is always striving."16 The negativism would be related to pathos. However, as Kierkegaard highlights, the negative attitude is always related to positivity, while the sole positive attitude does not allow the existing subject to refer to own existence and truth, which concerns the being in its existence, in its coming to be. "Negative thinkers therefore always have one advantage, in that they have something positive, being aware of the negative element in existence; the positive have nothing at all, since they are deceived. Precisely because the negative is present in existence, and present everywhere (for existence is a constant process of becoming), it is necessary to become aware of its presence continuously, as the only safeguard against it."17
The relation between positivity and negativity is related to the presence of pathos in the lived experience of the existing subject. "That the subjective existing thinker is as positive as he is negative, can also be expressed by saying that he is as sensitive to the comic as to the pathetic."18 Kierkegaard argues that "for anyone who exists in a double reflection, the proportions are equal: as much of the pathetic, so much also of the comic. The equality in the relationship provides a mutual security, each guaranteeing the soundness of the other. The pathos which is not secured by the presence of the comic is illusion; the comic spirit that is not made secure by the presence of pathos is immature,"19 by which he means the incapability of making a choice and making a decision that leads the existing subject towards the truth regarding ordinary existence [Tilvaerelse] and proper existence [Existents] . The improper connection, "the discrepancy"20 -a contradiction, an inconsistency between the infinite and the mundane, between the eternal and the coming to be, is indicated by Kierkegaard as the basis of the comical and the pathetic. One may easily notice that, as conceived in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the existential pathos -as a pathetic characteristic of existence -is strictly linked with comicality, the comical characteristics of existence. "Existence itself, the act of existing, is a striving, and is both pathetic and comic in the same degree. It is pathetic because the striving is infinite; that is, it is directed toward the infinite, being an actualisation of infinitude, a transformation which involves the highest pathos. It is comic, because such a striving involves a self-contradiction."21 Furthermore, Kierkegaard defines the pathos of the poet, the literary pathos, i.e. the world aesthetic pathos, as a pathos of possibilities, and "ethically speaking" as a pathos of immaturity, because "ethical maturity" is based on the prescription that our own ethical reality should be apprehended as infinitely more important than the understanding of "the entire process of human history"22, i.e. than the inclusion of individual choices and decisions in an alleged system of historical development of a being. From an ethical point of view, "ethically" it is essential "that there is to be no other transformation than my own."23 On numerous occasions, Kierkegaard disputes Hegel's conception of dialectics, the system and the implicit historical necessities, indicating the necessity of referring in choices and decisions to the individual and the subjective. The Dane combines the transformation of individual existence with a pathetic manner of experiencing existence and, simultaneously, the pathetic expression of this transformed existence. "If then an existing individual is to realize a pathetic relationship to an eternal happiness, his existence must express the relationship."24 Kierkegaard argues it is not that the existence would give the possibility of such expression, but that it would pathetically constitute a certain testimony. The pathos "does not consist in testifying about an eternal happiness, but in transforming one's existence into a testimony concerning it"; it "consists in expressing this existentially in the medium of existence."25 "For the finite and the infinite are put together in existence, in the existing individual; the existing individual has therefore no need to trouble himself to create existence, or to imitate existence in thought, but needs all the more to concentrate upon existing."26 "As an existing individual he is not called upon to create existence out of the finite and the infinite; but as one who is himself composed of finite and infinite it is his task."27 The dialectical interweaving of the pathetic with the comical, in an ever-individual existence would constitute a manifestation of this "composition" and its complexity. Kierkegaard admits suffering, linked with all duration of existence, as an "essential" expression (manifestation) of existential pathos.28 The Dane considers guilt to be the "decisive" manifestation of existential pathos,29 the decisive manifestation "for the pathetic relationship of an exister to an eternal happiness,"30 -to an eternal salvation.
Pathos seems characteristic of that which is tragic, and Kierkegaard considers suffering an "essential" manifestation of existential pathos. However, he finds aesthetic pathos additionally in that which is comical, and combines existential pathos with humour; within the comical, he distinguishes between humour and irony, particularly in Fear and Trembling. Kierkegaard argues that humour "reflects upon the consciousness of guilt as a totality."31 Humour allows us to see the generality as well as the relative particularity of our own situation. It pertains to "a totality", but simultaneously allows us to gain distance from it, to hold to the true judgement, as humour "is therefore truer than all comparative measuring and gauging"32. As is known, Kierkegaard described that which is related to humour and irony, as well as the comical, in various respects, such as in its relation to the tragic.
Referring to the Old Testament, Kierkegaard attempted to specify -apart from the irony of Job -the humour of Abraham, while in his work On the Concept of Irony with constant reference to Socrates, he described ironic mediatisation along with the directness of humour. In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the Danish philosopher defines humour as a certain manifestation of "the reality of the suffering"33 -a sign of exposing faith to a trial, and its comical, humorous confirmation. However, one cannot mistake humour for ironic negation, with the discrepancy between thought and opinion declared in speech, typical for irony. Kierkegaard argues that in terms of humour, existential pathos combines with religious pathos, as he finds humour to be an expression of a pathetic engagement of the subject in existence. "As a humorist exists, he also expresses himself."34 A humorist "comprehends the significance of suffering as relevant to existence, but he does not comprehend the significance of the suffering itself; he understands that it belongs to existence, but does not understand its significance except through the principle that suffering belongs. The first thought is the pain in the humoristic consciousness, the second is the jest, and hence it comes about that one is tempted both to weep and to laugh when the humorist speaks. He touches upon the secret of existence in the pain,"35 and, by mocking suffering, makes visible its universality, while in humour -its generality. aim of existence, being eternal salvation, as well as humour, combines existential pathos and the pathetic of the religious life stage.
The pathetic of the religious stage
In Stages on Life's Way, Søren Kierkegaard highlights that the religious plays the same role as the aesthetic, but on a higher level. "The aesthetic sphere is the sphere of immediacy, the ethical the sphere of requirement (and this requirement is so infinite that the individual always goes bankrupt), the religious the sphere of fulfillment."36 One might say that the distinction between the three stages of life, as indicated by Kierkegaard, is simultaneously related to the increasing direction of the subject towards the internal sphere of thought and experience. However, such a distinction would be an over-simplification. Kierkegaard connects the subsequent stages of existence with the diversity of the eccentric and concentric attitudes of the subject. These two types of attitude intertwine in a particular way with dialectic and pathetic in the religious stage when the existing subject searches for the relation of its own existence to Transcendence, because that which is religious constitutes the "purest" pathos. "The religious individual has as such made the discovery of the comical in largest measure, and yet he does not regard the comical as the highest, for religiosity is the purest pathos."37
Next, in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard confronts religiousness pathetically and dialectically infused, indicating the mutual entanglements of both aspects, but also the similarities between the aesthetic and the religious pathos. He writes: "Generally one is not contemporaneously aware"38 of the dialectical and the pathetic. "The religious address is inclined to present the pathetic factor and to annul the dialectic"39, both in the sense of logical argumentation and the dialectics of die Geschichte -Hegelian dialectics that historically relativises the being. Therefore, the religious message is sometimes, despite the best of intentions, "a confused tumultuous pathos, composed of all sorts of things, aesthetics, ethics, religiousness A, and Christianity, and hence it is sometimes self-contradictory."40
One must highlight that, in the case of the religious stage of life, the pathetic is primarily related to the A type religiousness, where the internalisation of the religious experience is intertwined with its external manifestations, with the pathos-filled expression. Defining the two types of religiousness, Kierkegaard describes religiousness A as related to the external manifestation of faith and the excess of affective approach towards it, i.e. to the aesthetic pathos. "Religiousness A can exist in paganism, and in Christianity it can be the religiousness of everyone who is not decisively Christian"41, whereas a "deepened" religiousness B would be typical of Christianity -paradoxical, demanding the specification of pathos by dialectic, by subjective recognition of one's own experiences, deepened by the assimilation of their contents, including the phenomena of one's own faith, suffering, and contrition. Kierkegaard writes about a reverse affection of the dialectical in the pathetic as a certain empowerment of pathos -about "the retroactive effect of the dialectical upon the pathetic, and the factors simultaneously present in this pathos"42. However, in the case of religiousness A accomplished in the eccentricity of cult and religious rites, in an extreme experience of sin, compunction and contrition, it is difficult to grasp that which is dialectical.
Kierkegaard highlights that the urge of human being to position itself in relation to Christianity without pathos is imprudent and "[r]eligiousness A must first be present in the individual before there can be any question of becoming aware of the dialectic of B."43 "The distinction between the pathetic and the dialectical must, however, be more closely defined; for religiousness A is by no means undialectic, but it is not paradoxically dialectic. Religiousness A is the dialectic of inward transformation; it is the relation to an eternal happiness which is not conditioned by anything but is the dialectic inward appropriation of the relationship, and so is conditioned only by the inwardness of the appropriation and its dialectic."44 However, often, Christianity is paradoxical and absurd in the form of aesthetic hash that may be seen in religiousness A, reducing faith to a group cult and external ritual. One could say about religiousness A that it could be practised at any time in any place, because "it has only human nature in general as its assumption."45 In contrast, religiousness B is "the paradoxical religiousness", which "has the dialectical in the second instance"46 -it serves the "deeper dialectical apprehensions of inwardness"47, bringing the subject close to Transcendence and to the contents of faith. Religiousness B "defines more closely the eternal happiness (whereas in A the only closer definitions are the closer definitions of inward apprehension), not defining more closely the individual apprehension of it, but defining more closely the eternal happiness itself, though not as a task for thought, but paradoxically as a repellent to produce new pathos."48
In religiousness B, pathos, along with faith, is submitted to a certain inward deepening, while dialectic relates the subject not to the world of Immanence, as in religiousness A, but to spiritual Transcendence. The dialectic balance of the relation of the subject to the mundane, earthly world that is characteristic of religiousness A is transformed into a search for the dialectical balance of the relation of the subject to Transcendence. However, facing Transcendence, we remain in a pathetic relation -characterised by suffering, guilt and a potential fiasco in pursuit of the aim of eternal salvation.
One may say that Kierkegaard associates religiousness B with internalised pathos, with experience that may lead the subject to salvation by heroic deeds. Eventually, doubt comes into a paradoxical relation with faith, which turns out to be based on absurd rather than rational arguments. The dialectics of the balancing of the relation between the individual and the general, Immanence and Transcendence, supports pathos also in the aesthetic and ethical stage. However, in religiousness B, the dialectics yields before the ever-unbalanced relation of the subject to Transcendence -the dialectics is submitted to internalisation: the subject struggles for the harmonisation of paradoxical faith and reason because "the martyrdom of faith (crucifixion of the understanding) is not a martyrdom of the instant but precisely the martyrdom of endurance."49 Therefore, Kierkegaard places the subject in a paradoxical and absurd relation to Transcendence, because it is given due to faith and explained only by way of references to the world of mundane Immanence. In the aesthetic and ethical stages of life, it may bring about a certain feeling of dialectical harmony, a fulfilment here and now. However, the religious stage contains a belief that the given life is only a promise of that which is perfect and eternally existent. The insufficiency of dialectic and its assumed negativity, in the religious stage of life, require a supplementation with the pathetic, by searching for the absolute subjective and objective positivity of the being and its existence. Ultimately, the search turns out to be balanced by negativity and ends with an even stronger feeling of sin and guilt. According to Kierkegaard, the aesthetic pathos -which should not be mistaken for sublimity -achieves an appropriate reference to Transcendence in the religious stage, as religious pathos. This stance, appropriate for the religious stage, allows the existing subject to be aware of the qualitative advantage of Transcendence over Immanence and over the subject itself, and allows it to get closer in action to the transcendent normativity with its appropriate pathos, to Transcendence, which no human being can recognise entirely and which no human being can match up to. 
Phenomenalism as a manifestation of Transcendence -the pathetic response of the subject of faith and knowledge
In this case of the appropriate reference to Transcendence, the cognitive recognition of a phenomenon is the recognition by the subject of its own mental states along with their contents -fear, suffering, contrition, and love. Assimilation, as the next cognitive step, determines the deepening of this knowledge, and may be conceived as a type of semiosis that combines the recognition of a mental state, accomplished due to its cognitive phenomenalisation, with a deepened cognition of its contents -its sense and meaning. As is known, Søren Kierkegaard connects the concept of subjective truth with the conception of assimilation, because the recognition itself of the subject of cognition -its own suffering, contrition, and faith as mental states along with its detailed contents -is insufficient for accomplishing assimilation and semiosis. Simply put, the recognition of a mental state as a dynamic phenomenalisation, a manifestation in subjectivity -e.g. Transcendence in the case of the phenomena of faith and contrition -requires an additional assimilation of detailed contents, their adoption along with meanings.
One may say that in the case of religiousness A, when the subject still demands a confirmation of its own faith via pathetic, excessively expressive religious involvement, the subject continuously accomplishes the phenomenalisation anew. However, there is a lack of assimilation, i.e. recognition of the contents of the phenomenon along with their meanings. The phenomenon of faith as a mental state appears insufficient continuously, due to the lack of a sufficient assimilation of the contents of faith and their meanings. Phenomenalisation does not sufficiently direct the subject to Transcendence, but is rather considered within the mundane Immanence of the earthly world.
The issue of phenomenalisation in Kierkegaard's thought is also considered in reference to the phenomenological tradition of Edmund Husserl and his followers. In this investigative context, the matter of intention also appears -i.e. the voluntary attitude and the cognitive direction of the subject of cognition and existence (similar to Martin Heidegger). The issue of intention proves helpful in specifying faith as a mental phenomenon that requires a pathetic attitude. In the case of religiousness A, the intention of the subject is focused on the mundane Immanence of the earthly world and there is a lack of a sufficient assimilation of the contents of faith, whereas the proper and right content of faith -not only according to Kierkegaard -would be Transcendence as a certain spiritual universe. Mental states (states of the soul) are manifestations, i.e. the phenomena of Transcendence. However, they require additional recognition: the assimilation of their contents and the semiosis of their meanings. They are a result of the mundane phenomenalisation of Transcendence itself which, in this way, becomes partially accessible. It is aided by the process of the re-subjectivisation of truth, a cognitive reference of the subject to its own mental states, as well as the process of assimilating the contents of faith along with their semiosis: with the recognition of the meanings of religious experience along with accepting them. Acceptance should be deprived of cognitive scepticism which, in the case of a superficial religiousness A, is balanced by the patheticness of the emotional involvement and an excessive, hyperbolic expression of faith.
